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COMES NOW Appellant/Cross-Respondent TracFone Wireless, Inc., and hereby
submits this brief, in part in Reply to the various Respondents' Briefs filed in this matter, and in
part in Response to the Cross-Appeal filed by Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties
(collectively, "the Counties").

As this Reply Brief is combined with TracFone's Cross-

Respondent's Brief, pursuant to I.AR. 35(c), it contains the elements required by I.AR. 35(b).

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the interest of brevity, TracFone hereby reincorporates the Statement of the Case set
forth in its Opening Brief on Appeal, as if fully set forth in haec verba.

In addition, in

responding to the Counties' Cross-Appeal, TracFone clarifies these additional factual issues for
the Court, as they were misstated in the Statement of the Case set forth in Ada County's Brief
(incorporated into the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief). (Ada County Brief, pp. 1-10.)
Within the first two sentences of the Statement of the Case offered by the CrossAppellants, the Counties immediately misstate the facts salient to this dispute.

The Cross-

Appellants state: "Since being allowed to operate in Idaho, TracFone has refused to remit the
statutorily required emergency communications fee . . . . " (Ada County Brief, p. 1.) This
statement is not accurate, and requires correction in order to ensure that the record is clear.
Although the Respondents/Cross-Appellants argue that they possess the power to determine what
entities are "allowed to operate in Idaho," federal law expressly dictates otherwise:
"Notwithstanding sections 152(b) and 221 (b) of this title, no State or local government shall
have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile
service or any private mobile service . . . . " 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
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Counties' claim, neither they nor any other governmental entity in this state have the power to
grant or deny permission to a commercial mobile radio service provider, like TracFone, do to
business in this state.

This misleading and, indeed, erroneous statement fails to accurately

portray TracFone's right to do business in the state ofldaho, and instead infers that TracFone has
taken advantage of some permission they suggest has been gratuitously granted to it by the state.
That characterization is simply untrue.
Moreover, the Counties' further statement that TracFone has "refused to remit the
statutorily required emergency communications fee" is disingenuous and is belied by the factual
and procedural history provided by both sides of this Appeal. As noted in the Idaho Emergency
Communications Commission's Brief ("IECC Brief'), "TracFone has been providing wireless
telecommunications service in Idaho since 1997." (IECC Brief, p. 3.) However, as the Record
reflects, it was not until 2011 that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (notably not the IECC
or any of the counties responsible for the administration of the Emergency Communications Act)
ever suggested or asserted that TracFone was obligated to collect and remit E-911 fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 31-4804. (See R. at 000503.) TracFone has, through this litigation, pursued a
legitimate legal challenge to the contention that it had any such statutory obligation. The CrossAppellants' assertion that TracFone has simply "refused" to remit E-911 fees is a
mischaracterization of the historical facts and procedure leading to this Appeal.
Unfortunately, rather than focus on the factual and legal merits of the case sub Judice, the
Counties falsely accuse TracFone of "attempting to introduce new evidence on appeal." (Ada
County Brief, p. 1, n. 2.) This is incorrect, as all that TracFone offered was a purely informative

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 2

19360-001

description of how prepaid cellular telephone service is provided in the telecommunications
industry - something never before disputed, and which formed the basis for many of the District
Court's rulings. (See, e.g., R. at 000014,
at 000244,

,r

,r 7 (Complaint); R.

7 (Ada County Answer); R. at 000253,

f

at 000021,

,r 7 (IECC Answer); R.

7 (IAC Answer); R. at 000534 (IECC

Memorandum in Support of initial Partial Summary Judgment effort, describing the billing
transaction for prepaid service.)

It is impermissible for the Counties to wait until a Cross-

Appellants' Brief with this Court to suggest that the collective parties' foundational
understanding of prepaid service is somehow inaccurate. 1
Returning, then, to the critical issues in this Appeal, TracFone notes also that much of the
discussion in the Statements of the Case submitted by the Respondents/Cross-Appellants is
irrelevant to the narrow issues necessary for this Court to address in this interlocutory appeal.
In the pages that follow, Tracfone will respond to the points raised in the briefs of the
IECC, Ada County and the IAC. Given, however, the length of those briefs and the multiple
arguments raised in them, it is appropriate to bring the essence of the dispute back into focus.
This can be done by asking two questions:
1. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that TracFone's resold wireless

service is an "other communication service" within the meaning of section 314802(13)(d)? (R. at 001847-1849.) In this Reply Brief, TracFone will first explain the
error of the trial court's conclusion in that regard.
2. If that conclusion is incorrect, whether this Court may re-write the plain and
1

The Counties' accusation against TracFone is particularly disturbing in view of their own
introduction of new evidence in support of its Cross-Appeal, discussed below. (See, e.g., CrossAppeal Brief, p. 12 (introducing a Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of "specialized,"
which was never introduced or argued below).)
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unambiguous language of subsection (d), to conform with what Respondents
speculate might have been the public policy objective of the legislature?
TracFone will demonstrate that, under this Court's established precedent, it may not
so do.

In addressing these two questions, TracFone notes that much of the argument advanced
by the Respondents

focuses

not

on the

language

of the

statutory definition of

"telecommunications provider," as codified in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13), and whether TracFone
falls within its purview, but rather on their view of the purpose of the Emergency
Communications Act, codified in Idaho Code § 31-4801. (See, e.g., Ada County Brief, p. 11.)
Citing to "the intent and purpose" of the Act, Ada County states: "In other words, if a person
dials 911, regardless of the communications service he or she uses (whether it be a standard landline or wireless phone, and regardless of whether the customer 'prepays' or 'postpays '), that use
is subject to the 911 fee." (Id.) The Respondents all miss the mark in this regard.
Whether or not the legislature might have intended for every consumer utilizing an
interconnected communications service in the state of Idaho to be obligated to pay a 911 fee is
not the issue in this Appeal. The Respondents and Cross-Appellants have not asserted claims
against the body of consumers that they contend ought to have paid E-911 fees, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 31-4804(2), when those consumers purchased and/or used TracFone's services for
the last several years. Rather, they are asking this Court to place TracFone into the shoes of
those customers, and to pay those taxes from its own resources, on the customers' behalf, on the
unsupportable assertion that TracFone was a "telecommunications provider" obligated to collect
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and remit those taxes all along.2 LC.§§ 31-4802(13), 31-4804(2). The problem that arises is
that the Respondents' /Cross-Appellants' primary focus throughout their briefing, as is evident by
the first two paragraphs of Ada County's Argument section (Id.), asks the Court not to read the
literal statutory definition of "telecommunications provider" under the Act (LC. § 31-4802(13)),
but to instead disregard that explicit statutory definition in order to apply what it asserts to be the
intent of the legislature.

As set forth in TracFone's Opening Brie±: and restated herein, the

specific legislative language of the definition of "telecommunications provider" - whether
deliberately by the legislature or as a matter of oversight - does not support a finding that
TracFone was an obligated "telecommunications provider" as defined by the Act. 3
Regardless of what may have been the legislature's intent with regard to the
consumers/purchasers of communications services - and whether those consumers were intended
to pay the E-911 taxes - the gravamen of this Appeal questions only whether TracFone falls

2

For purposes of the instant Appeal, it is important to recognize that the District Court has not
yet determined whether TracFone is obligated to pay anything. This Appeal is limited to the
question of whether the statute, as written, plainly and unambiguously imposed a collection and
remittance obligation on TracFone. (R. at 001858.)
3 Though the Respondents repeatedly argue that TracFone "admitted" in the underlying PUC
proceedings that it is a "telecommunications provider" (IECC Brief, pp. 8-9), this argument fails
to acknowledge the definitional differences applicable to that proceeding versus the present
proceeding. (See R. at 001018-19 (distinguishing the broader definition of "telecommunications
carrier" under 47 U.S.C. § 153(51), which was the relevant definition for the purposes that
confronted the PUC when TracFone applied to the PUC for designation as an Eligible
Telecommunications Carrier pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2)).) While TracFone may be a
"Telecommunications Carrier" as that term is defined under federal law, i.e. the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 153(51), that fact is irrelevant to determining TracFone's
status under the narrower definition of "telecommunications provider" set forth in I.C. § 314802(13).
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within the definition of "telecommunications provider" under Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13 ), such
that it was subject to the fee collection and remittance obligation of Section 31-4804(2).

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether TracFone is entitled to attorney fees on the Counties' Cross-Appeal, pursuant to
Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, 12-123, and/or Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

III.

REPLY ARGUMENT

A. TracFone Does Not Provide "Other Communications Service" By The Plain
Meaning Of Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d).
The undeniable facts of this case require the conclusion that the telecommunications

service that TracFone provides to its customers is the exact service, and not some "other"
service, as the service discussed in Idaho Code § 3 l-4802(13)(b ). This is a fact that, despite its
ultimate ruling to the contrary, even the District Court was forced to begrudgingly admit: "It
must be acknowledged at the outset that at a particular level of abstraction, Tracfone is correct

that the service it provides is the same as that provided by a licensed carrier." (R. at 00184 7
(emphasis added).) Further, the District Court had to acknowledge that the plain language of the
statute "distinguishes service types based upon such things as the type of medium through which
the raw information is transmitted (e.g. landline, radio transmissions, Internet traffic, etc)," and
not the method of sale of the provider. (R. at 001848.) Even the evidence submitted by the
IECC supports the fact that the service TracFone resells is the same as the statutorily-defined
"wireless carriers" from whom it purchases the same: "As a reseller of other carriers' wireless
services, TracFone's service is of the same quality and reliability as that of its underlying
vendors." (R. at 000379.) Specifically, TracFone provides "[v]oice grade access to the public

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 6

19360-001

switched telecommunications network," meaning it provides its purchasers with "the ability to
make and receive traditional voice phone calls between the approximately 500 Hertz and 4,000
Hertz for a bandVvidth of approximately 3500 Hertz." (R. at 000375.) "TracFone provides
service in Idaho by reselling services of underlying wireless network carriers, including AT&T
Mobility, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless." (R. at 000377.) As TracFone is merely a reseller of
those licensed wireless carriers' wireless telecommunications services, there is no basis to
conclude that the nature of the resold services provided by TracFone is in any way altered, so as
to become an "other communications service" as that term is used in LC. § 31-4802(13)(d).
In a tacit acknowledgment that it has no viable argument that the services TracFone
offers are any different than the wireless services covered by Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b),
which is problematic for the Respondent's position in view of the plain and common meaning of
the word "other" in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d), the IECC attempts to pivot its argument to
assert that TracFone has incorrectly asserted that the various subsections of Idaho Code § 314802(13) were intended to distinguish between types of service that a "telecommunications
provider" is capable of "providing." (IECC Brief, pp. 11-13.) Instead, the IECC attempts to
ignore the prefatory language of this definitional statute and simply asserts that "the language of
subsection (b) specifies a type of provider, not a type of service." (IECC Brief, p. 13 (emphasis
in original).)

It does so in disregard to the unassailable fact that Section 31-4802(13)(d)

specifically states "providing other communications service" rather than "other providers of
communications service," consistent with the introductory language of the statute that sets up the
differentiation between the types "telecommunications providers" as between what those
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providers are "providing." The IECC has simply attempted to read subsection (b) in isolation so
as to avoid the obvious absurdity that arises when reading the statute as a whole. 4 In contrast to
the IECC' s argument, and as further evidence of the inability of the Respondents and the District
Court to find a harmonious and unified rationale for applying this statute to TracFone, even the
District Court eventually held that the various subsections of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)
pertained to different types of service:
[I]t is clear in the statute that the trappings of a particular service
matter when determining the applicability of the Act to a particular
person. This is undeniable from the separate subsections of
section 31-4802(13 ), which distinguishes service types based upon
such things as the type of medium through which the raw
information is transmitted (e.g. landline, radio transmission,
Internet traffic, etc) or the licensure of the service provider.
(R. at 001848 (emphasis added).)

Because the literal reading of Idaho Code § 3 l-4802(13)(d) does not assist the
Respondents in this Appeal, they instead ask the Court not to "overly-literalize [the] statute
against its clear intent" (IAC Brief, p. 12.) In doing so, however, and despite their efforts to
avoid acknowledging this fact, the Respondents necessarily also ask this Court to engage in a
practice of statutory construction in order to conform the statute to read consistent with what

4

Notably, the IECC does not take its argument to the literal conclusion that because subsection
(b) does refer to a defined provider and not a service provided, the plain language of Idaho Code
§ 31-4802(13)(b) literally says, '"Telecommunications provider' means any person providing
any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The
Respondents would be hard-pressed to argue that AT&T provides its customers with a wireless
carrier; rather, quite plainly, those licensed entities provide their customers with wireless service.
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they contend to be the legislative intent. 5 The United States Supreme Court has been clear,
however: "[T]his Court does not revise legislation ... just because the text as written creates an
apparent anomaly as to some subject it does not address .... [S]uch anomalies often arise from
statutes, if for no other reason than that Congress typically legislates by parts-addressing one
thing without examining all others that might merit comparable treatment. ... 'Congress wrote
the statute it wrote' -

meaning, a statute going so far and no further." .Michigan v. Bay .Mills

Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2033-34.

The Respondents cannot have it both ways: If the statute is to be read plainly and
literally, then it must be acknowledged that TracFone does not provide its customers with "any
wireless carrier[s]" (subsection (b)), nor does it provide its customers with "provider[s] of other
communications service" (subsection (d)). If, on the other hand, it is acknowledged (as the
District Court acknowledged) that the subsections of the statute are characterized by different
forms of service, then it cannot be said that TracFone provides "other communications service"
than that which is already addressed in subsection (b); TracFone only resells the same exact
"wireless ... telecommunications service" that it purchases directly from the licensed wireless
carriers addressed in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(b ), and nothing "other" than that.
In contrast to the arguments advanced by Ada County, the fact that TracFone resells its
5

Though, in the interest of brevity, TracFone rests on its initial briefing regarding the various
evidentiary matters that it has appealed, it continues to argue that when the District Court
determined itself unable to abide by the plain and literal language of the statute, and instead
turned to the apparent intent of the legislature to make sense of the problematic wording of the
statute, it should have also admitted and considered all other evidence pertinent to what that
legislative intent may have been - including and especially several years' worth of IECC
Meeting Minutes that specifically address this very issue.
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service on a prepaid basis does not render its service an "other communications service" within
Section 31-4802(13)(d).

(Contra Ada County Brief, pp. 17-24.)

As the District Court

recognized, "the focus of each separate definition is on what a provider does, not how it
charges." (R. at 001035.) Though Ada County has attempted to justify the District Court's
conclusion that TracFone provides an "other communications service" on the fact that the
business model is based on resale, the argument is unsupported, unsupportable, and erroneous. 6
As reiterated above, the commercial mode through which TracFone is able to provide wireless
service to its customers do not alter the nature of the wireless telecommunications service;
whether the commercial transaction is between TracFone and the various wireless carriers whose
services it resells, or between TracFone and its consumers (whether individuals or retailers like
Wal-Mart), the interconnected wireless telecommunications service remains the same.
Finally, it is significant that only Ada County attempted to stand by or justify where the
District Court ultimately settled on how

TracFone

supposedly provides an "other

communications service." The District Court's reasoning was conclusory and incomplete, in
determining that "resold" service was unambiguously "other" service. (See R. at 001847-1848.)

Ada County attempts to revise the rulings of the District Court, perhaps in an effort to alleviate
the fact that neither the Respondents nor the District Court were able to fit TracFone seamlessly
into the statutory definition of "telecommunications provider." (Ada County Brief, pp. 22-24
"TracFone Incorrectly States That The District Court Based Its Decision On TracFone's Prepaid
Billing Practice.") To the contrary, the District Court based its initial decision on exactly that: "it
is clear that prepaid wireless service is precisely the kind of "other" communications service
intended .... " (R. at 001045.) The District Court then recognized on reconsideration that its
"prepaid" ruling was in error: " ... the Court concedes that where it wrote 'it is clear that
prepaid wireless service ... ' the better wording would have been 'it is clear that resold wireless
service .... '" (R. at 001846.)
6
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The only distinction that the District Court was able to identify between TracFone's service and
its underlying wireless carriers' service was that "Tracfone sells its own branded handsets, sells
minutes and/or airtime in particular locations and by particular methods, maintains its own
customer communications and customer service apparatus, and offers billing arrangement that
may or may not be available from a licensed carrier." 7 (R. at 001848.) Without any additional
analysis, Ada County has merely adopted the District Court's incorrect conclusions.

(Ada

County Brief, pp. 20-21.) These distinctions, however, are without merit.
Those service features enumerated by the District Court and embraced by Ada County
are not unique to TracFone or to resellers.
handsets,

selling

minutes

or

airtime

m

Each of those listed features (sale of branded
particular

locations,

maintaining

customer

communications and customer service apparatus, and offering billing arrangements) are features
of wireless service provided by every wireless carrier and every reseller operating in the State. 8
Every seller and reseller of wireless service available in the marketplace provides
services with those same features that were identified by the District Court, including AT&T,
Verizon Wireless, and I-Mobile. The fact that each company sells its own branded handsets,
offers different packages of monthly minutes, provides its own customer service, or offers
7

Inclusion of "billing arrangements" on the District Court's list of service features was incorrect
and is contradicted by the record, which indicates that TracFone's service is provided on a
rrepaid basis only, and that the company offers no billing arrangements. (R. at 001035.)
The District Court did not base its decision TracFone provides "other communications service"
on any facts in the record, and specifically not on any facts regarding the various features that it
identified as the impetus for such a classification. In fact, the District Court specifically
instructed TracFone not to submit "facts" to dispute the Respondents' partial summary judgment
motion (Tr. 6/14/13, pp. 44:15 - 45:7), but nevertheless proceeded to issue its final decision
based upon the unsupported facts of these allegedly distinguishing features.
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differing billing arrangements, has nothing to do with the nature of the wireless service that
causes it to fall within Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(b ), versus some other subsection. Indeed, it is
not any of these features relied upon by the District Court that distinguish the wireless carriers in
subsection (b) from the providers of exchange telephone service (subsection (a)) or
interconnected VoIP service (subsection (c)). 9

Rather, as the District Court had correctly

determined at one point below, the statute "distinguishes service types based upon such things as
the type of medium through which the raw information is transmitted (e.g. landline, radio
transmission, Internet traffic, etc)." (R. at 001848.) Though all types of service providers
(exchange telephone, wireless, and Vo IP) provide each of these features incidental to their
businesses and the associated commercial arrangements with their customers, those features
simply do not define the type of "communications service" that customers purchase. 10
The District Court erred when it determined that the unambiguous meaning of "other
communications service" in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )( d) included service that was, by all
accounts and admissions, the exact same communications service as already provided for in
Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b), albeit with minor differences in commercial arrangements. 11

9

VoIP is an acronym for Voice over Internet Protocol. See I.C. § 31-4802(14).
Put another way, TracFone's handsets, customer service, and airtime would be useless without
the communications service (i.e. the method of information transmission) that is the same as, and
not "other" than, that which is provided by the entities defined as wireless carriers under LC. §
31-4802(15).
11
Though TracFone contends that the definition of "telecommunications provider"
unambiguously (though perhaps inadvertently) does not include an unlicensed reseller of
wireless service, as wireless service is addressed in subsection (b) of the statute but the definition
is limited to those licensees set forth in LC. § 31-4802(15), it must be noted in the alternative
that, at a minimum, TracFone's usage of the word "other" in its interpretation of subsection (d) is
10
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B. Respondents Ignore The Plain and Literal Language Of Idaho Code§ 314802(13)( d).

Having demonstrated that the term "other," when read plainly and literally, necessarily
refers to something different than the type of wireless service that TracFone and its competitors
in the cellular telephone industry offer, this Brief will tum to the additional arguments that are
submitted by the Respondents in opposition to TracFone's Appeal.
Respondents all purport to rely first and foremost on the canon of statutory construction
that requires Idaho courts to examine the literal words of a statute and, where those literal words
are unambiguous, follow the literal words as wTitten. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l 1\1ed.
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011) ("The interpretation of a statute 'must begin

with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written."') (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139
Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)).

On this principle, TracFone agrees: The literal

language of the Idaho Emergency Communications Act must be the central focus of this Court's
analysis in determining whether that law clearly and unambiguously applies to TracFone.
However, as each of the Respondents attempt to craft an argument as to how the literal
words ofldaho Code § 31-4802(13) apply to TracFone, their strict adherence to this fundamental

not patently unreasonable. To that end, and though TracFone does not believe that the
Respondents' interpretation of the term "other" is reasonable, TracFone has at least provided a
second reasonable interpretation of the statute, thereby demonstrating ambiguity according to the
rules governing statutory construction. Ver ska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889,896,265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011).
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principle is subtly abandoned in an attempt to re-draft the statutory language to align with what
the Respondents contend is consistent with their perception of the statutory purpose. Instead, the
Respondents disregard the literal language of the definition of "telecommunications provider"
and ask this Court to construe the statute to fulfill what they claim to be the stated "purpose" of
the Act. 12 (See, e.g., IECC Brief, p. 6 (citing LC. § 31-4801).) As this Court has previously
declared, however, "[t]he asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain
meaning." Ver ska, 151 Idaho at 892-93 (citation omitted). No matter what might have been the
legislature's intended purpose in passing the Act, this Court cannot supplant the actual wording
of the statute with a modified version: "If it is socially or economically unsound, the power to
correct it is legislative, not judicial." Verska, 151 Idaho at 895 (quoting Herndon v. West, 87
Idaho 335, 339, 393 P.2d 35, 37 (1964)).
In this Reply, then, TracFone focuses the discussion back onto the actual statute at issue
m this litigation: Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 ), as amended in 2007.

That statute, defining

"telecommunications provider" for purposes of the entire Act (including the fee collection and
remittance obligation ofldaho Code§ 31-4804), reads:

12

At times, the Respondents even go so far as to affirmatively assert that the language of the Act
is something other than what is actually contained therein, thus reforming the statute to better fit
their arguments in this Appeal. For example, Respondent State/IECC asserts that "[t]he [2007]
Amendment added VoIP service providers and 'any person providing any other
communications service' that connects its customers in Idaho to 911 ...." (IECC Brief, p. 3
(emphasis added).) The IECC therefore purports to have directly quoted the 2007 version of the
Act, utilizing quotation marks without modifying ellipses or bracketed alteration. However, the
language supposedly quoted by the IECC does not exist in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)- the IECC
is seemingly asking this Court to decide this matter based on "literal language" that is not in the
statute, but that the IECC has simply rewritten to suit its position here.
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(13) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing:
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this
state; or
(b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to
any customer having a place of primary use within this state; or
(c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of
primary use within this state; or
(d) A provider of any other communications service that connects
an individual having either a service address or a place of primary
use within this state to an established public safety answering point
by dialing 911.
The literal words of this statute do not and cannot apply to TracFone.

Because all parties

concede that TracFone does not provide either of the services in subsection (a) or (c), TracFone
will not address those sections in this analysis and will focus only on subsections (b) and (d).
Though the Respondents subtly ask this Court to disregard the literal language of the
statute in favor of an interpretation that better fulfills their understanding of the purpose of the
Act, there is no equivocating what the literal language of the Act says. Read literally, subsection
(b) of the definition of "telecommunications provider," when combined with the introductory
clause of that definition, undeniably reads: "'Telecommunications provider' means any person
providing [alny wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any customer having

a place of primary use within this state." LC.§ 31-4802(13)(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
literal words of subsection (d) of the definition of "telecommunications provider" state:
"'Telecommunications provider' means any person providing a provider of any other
communications service that connects an individual having either a service address or a place of
primary use within this state to an established public safety answering point by dialing 911."
LC.§ 31-4802(13)(d) (emphasis added).
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One can therefore see why the Respondents are quick to retreat from the literal language
of this statute, in favor of a fictionalized rendition of the same. Admittedly, when read by their
literal terms, Idaho Code §§ 31-4802(13 )(b) and (d)

produce a seemingly absurd result. It is

difficult to comprehend how a person might provide another with a wireless carrier, or with a
provider.

The reality is, however, that is exactly what the literal words of the statute

unmistakably say. As this Court made clear in Verska, "[W]e have never revised or voided an
unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results
when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do so." 151 Idaho at 896. If, as
all of the Respondents have asserted in their briefs, this Court is to apply the plain meaning of
the literal words of the statute, then this case should be promptly resolved in TracF one's favor.
TracFone does not provide its consumers with another provider or with a wireless carrier - it
provides them cellular telecommunications service.
The fact that the plain and literal language of Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13) arguably leads to
an absurd result, does not subject it to the canon of statutory construction that requires the courts
to only consider alternative reasonable constructions in assessing ambiguity. (See IECC Brief,
pp. 13-14 (citing Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary 1\1otorcycle, 154 Idaho
351, 298 P.3d 245 (2013)).) Rather, just as the IECC has admitted, "a court does not have the
discretion to avoid the plain language of a statute even when applying the statute as written
would be 'patently absurd, or would produce absurd results .... "' (IECC Brief, p. 8 (quoting
Ver ska, 151 Idaho at 896).) Moreover, as recently dictated by the United States Supreme Court,

a "Court does not revise legislation ... just because the text as written creates an apparent

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -Page 16

19360-001

anomaly as to some subject it does not address .... [A] Court has no roving license, in even
ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, to disregard clear language simply on the view that ...
Congress 'must have intended' something broader." lvfichigan v. Bay Afills Indian Community,
134 S.Ct. 2024, 2033-34 (2014).
C. Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) Cannot Be Judicially Amended Under The Guise Of
Repairing "lVIinor Syntactical Errors."

As justification for abandoning the literal words of the statute, the IECC next argues that
"minor syntactical errors" should not affect the Court's ability to "interpret the statute not as a
professor of English grammar would parse it but as the legislature intended it." (IECC Brief, p.
14 (citation omitted).) In other words, in a tacit admission that it cannot rely on the literal
language of the statute due to how it is written as a whole (including the definition's introductory
language), and in contrast to its claim that the statute may be unambiguously applied to
TracFone, the IECC is forced to rely on inapplicable principles of statutory interpretation to
understand what the legislature intended. "This Court has consistently adhered to the primary
canon of statutory construction that where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear
expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction."
Verska, 151 Idaho 895.
Importantly, however, the problem with the statutory definition of "telecommunications
provider" at issue in this litigation is not one of "minor syntactical errors." None of the cases
that are cited by the IECC in support of its argument, that "minor syntactical errors" should not
interfere with the Court's application of the plain language of the Act (IECC Brief, pp. 14-15),
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support the type of statutory modification that would be necessary to render Idaho Code § 314802(13) applicable to TracFone. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 51 P.3d 443 (Ct. App.
2002), for example, dealt only with interpreting a statute in view of certain adjective and comma
placement, resulting in the Idaho Court of Appeals rejecting the appellant's suggested reading as
"an absurd result." 137 Idaho at 632-633. Similarly, De Gorter v. Fed. Trade Comm 'n, 244
F .2d 270 (9 th Cir. 1957), examined the existing words of a statutory definition to ascertain the
scope of the definition in view of its awkward sentence structure and use of commasY
However, in neither of these cases did the courts perform the sort of statutory surgery that has
been suggested by the Respondents, here. Unlike the statutes at issue in Paciorek and De Gorter
(both of which were decided well before Verska), the definition of "telecommunications
provider" in this case does not suffer from simple or minor syntactical errors that may be read
using only the existing words of the statute. Rather, what the Respondents are asking this Court
to do is exactly that which is expressly prohibited by Verska: "[R]evise[] ... an unambiguous
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as

Notably, De Gorter dealt with, as here, interpretation of a concluding clause of a definitional
statute. See 244 F.2d at 278. The 9th Circuit rejected the Petitioners' contention that the
concluding clause (" ... or contains any form of misrepresentation ...") merely referred to the
types of misrepresentations that had already been addressed earlier in the definition: "It is
evidence that the last portion of this clause . . . covers misrepresentations relating to other
matters than the names or names of animals; otherwise it would be meaningless .... "[T]he
clause meant to cover other representations than those relating to names, which were mentioned
in the first paragraph of this subsection." Id. This case law corroborates TracFone's contention
that the phrase "other communications service" cannot be read to simply be a restatement of
those forms of communication service that had already been addressed in the first three
subsections of the definition of "telecommunications provider."
13
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written .... " 151 Idaho at 896. They uniformly contend that this Court should take a statute
that reads, as written:
"Telecommunications provider" means any person providing a
provider of any other communications service that connects an
individual having either a service address or a place of primary
use within this state to an established public safety answering
point by dialing 911. 14

and apply it as modified to fit their position in this case:
"Telecommunications provider" means any other provider of
communications service that connects an individual having
either a service address or a place of primary use within this
state to an established public safety answering point by dialing
911.

This is not, as in Paciorek or De Gorter, an issue of mere syntax or punctuation.

The

Respondents are undeniably asking this Court to omit words that the Respondents know produce
an absurd result, which this Court "do[es] not have the authority to do." Verska, 151 Idaho at
896; see also, Water Quality Ass'n v. United States, 795 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir., 1986) ("It is a basic
principle of statutory construction that courts have no right to first determine the legislative
intent of a statute, and then, under the guise of its interpretation, proceed to either add

words to or eliminate words from the statute's language." (Emphasis added.)).
Each of the Respondents, in slightly different ways, point the Court to what they think is
the intent and purpose of subsection (d), the supposed "catch all" provision. Here, they miss this
Court's teaching from In the Matter of the Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345,326 P.3d 347 (2014).

14

This is how the wording of the statute reads as a whole when the definition's introductory
language is combined with the language of subsection (d).
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Doe involved the question of whether same-sex couples were statutorily allowed to adopt. The

Magistrate, before looking the plain language of the adoption statute to see if was ambiguous,
looked at other statutory provisions to ascertain legislative intent and purpose, and then
concluded same-sex adoption was inconsistent with overall legislative intent.
reversed.

This court

The Magistrate erred by omitting the required first step in statutory analysis -

determining whether statutory language is ambiguous - before attempting to ascertain broader
legislative intent. This Court held there was nothing in the literal language of the adoption statute
precluding same-sex adoption and that resort by the Magistrate to other indications of public
policy purposes was improper: "Here, the magistrate's analysis constitutes a deviation from
existing law. The Magistrate skipped the first part of this Court's well-established standard examining the statute's literal words - and jumped directly to applying a rule statutory
construction ... " 326 P.3d at 352. In so holding, the Court was careful to note it was not
expressing an opinion on the wisdom of same-sex adoption - it was merely applying the law as
the legislature had written. Id. at 353. The same should hold .true here. Whether it would suit
sound public policy for TracFone to collect and remit a tax that the statute does not expressly
give it authority to collect is not for this Court to decide.
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the purpose for which the IECC cited the foregoing
case law was to support a proposition that runs directly contrary to this Court's recent discussion
in Verska. Though the IECC directly quotes Verska for this Court's instruction that "a court
does not have the discretion to avoid the plain language of a statute even when applying the
statute as written would be 'patently absurd, or would produce absurd results"' (IECC Brief, p. 8
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(quoting Verska, 151 Idaho at 896)), it nevertheless urges this Court to do just that: "avoid the
plain language" and disregard what the statute actually says on the premise that, according to the
IECC, following the rules of syntax in this case would "defeat the evident legislative intent."
(IECC Brief, p. 8.) The Respondents cannot have it both ways: If they are to contend that the
statute is unambiguous, then they must follow the literal language of the statute without
exception - language that, if applied, does not encompass TracFone and, arguably, might not
encompass any entity due to the absurdity of that literal language. Though the result may be
absurd, "the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." 151 Idaho at 895. Thus, although the
Respondents did not cite any authority from this Court in support of their contention that courts
may disregard the plain language of a statute on grounds of grammar or syntax, to the extent that
the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Paciorek conflicts with the rules of statutory construction
set forth in Ver ska, Paciorek should be overturned.
D. Taxing Statutes Must Be Strictly Construed Against Taxing Authorities.

From an early point in this litigation, TracFone reminded. the IECC and its counsel that
the office of the Idaho Attorney General (who represents the IECC in this action) had previously
issued two opinions relative to the Emergency Communications Act, specifically concluding that
the E-911 fee imposed by the Act is a tax. 15 (R. at 000594; 599-611; 683-685.) The record in

15

The notion that Idaho's E-911 fee is actually a tax was first noted in TracFone's request for a
Rule 56(f) continuance on the Respondents' original Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R.
at 000683-685.) In response to that Motion, none of the Respondents quarreled with the
contention at that time, nor did they at any subsequent time in the underlying proceedings.
Indeed, the IAC, who is now the only party contesting the taxing nature of the E-911 fee, did not
file any response to TracFone's Rule 56(f) Motion. (See R. at 000005-6.)
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this case reveals that the District Court shared that opinion, and it was never contested by any of
these Respondents in the proceedings below. (See, e.g., Tr. 6/14/13, p. 45:11-12 (the District
Court noting that "everybody seems to agree this is a tax," without objection from the IAC).) As
it is a taxing statute, TracFone urged that the District Court, and now this Court, apply a level of
strict scrutiny in construing the Act.
Now, however, Respondent IAC has raised a new argument in this Appeal, at least tacitly
suggesting that this Court should not view the state's E-911 fee as a tax, and that TracFone is not
entitled to the benefits of the rule of statutory construction requiring strict construction of taxing
statutes. (IAC Brief, pp. 4-6.) The IAC never raised this argument in the briefing before the
District Court; it is a new argument that must be disregarded. Beyond this procedural deficiency,
however, it fails as a matter of law on its merits.
The IAC's first argument is incomplete, but seems to suggest that the E-911 fee should
not be considered a tax. (IAC Brief, pp. 4-5.) The IAC criticizes TracFone's reliance on the two
Attorney General opinions that have previously determined the 911 fee to be a tax, on the basis
that "no appellate court in Idaho has ever ruled on the subject." (Id.) While it may be true that
an Idaho appellate court has never had occasion to evaluate the correctness of the Attorney
General's analysis, that does not mean that the fee is necessarily not a tax. In other words, it is
not necessary that the appellate courts of this state affirmatively pronounce a tax to be a tax
before it becomes one.

Rather, this Court has provided the appropriate test to distinguish

between a fee and a tax (Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988)), and
the Attorney General has appropriately applied that test to the Emergency Communications Fee
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imposed on purchasers of certain telecommunications services by Idaho Code § 31-4804(2). See
also 7 l Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § l 5 (1973) ("The distinction between a fee and a

tax is one that is not always observed with nicety in judicial decisions, but ... any payment
exacted by the state or its municipal subdivisions as a contribution toward the cost of
maintaining governmental functions, where the special benefit derived from their performance is
merged in the general benefit, is a tax."). As the IAC's argument is limited to criticism of
TracFone's reliance on those AG opinions, without any argument as to why or how the test in
Brewster should produce a different result (IAC Brief, pp. 4-5), the IAC has not effectively

completed its argument, and no further response is required from TracFone. If anything, the
internal conflict between the IAC's present position and the IECC's counsel's previous positions
regarding the E-911 tax supports TracFone's argument that this statute must be construed against
these taxing authorities.
The second argument offered by the IAC is that TracFone "is not a taxpayer, and
therefore not subject to the supposed relief Brewster grants." 16

(IAC Brief, p. 5.)

First,

TracFone submits that it is not accurate to say that Brewster 'grants relief under any
circumstances. Brewster speaks to the proper method of differentiating between a tax and a fee,
and no more. 115 Idaho at 503-505. Therefore, TracFone assumes that the IAC instead intended
to argue that TracFone, as an allegedly-obligated tax "collector" and not an end-user, should not
be entitled to rely on the rules of law governing strict construction of tax statutes. That rule of

The IAC's assertion that TracFone is not a taxpayer is curious, in light of the fact that the
IAC's member counties have filed this counterclaim against TracFone for allegedly unpaid taxes.
16
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law is set forth in Futura Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 92 Idaho 288,291,442 P.2d 174, 177
(1968), cited in the 1994 AG opinion on this matter, holding that taxing statutes must be
construed "as favorably as possible to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority."
(Emphasis added.) See also Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 53, 62 L. Ed. 211
(1917) ("In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend
their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they
are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." (Emphasis

added.)); United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187-88, 44 S. Ct. 69, 71, 68 L. Ed. 240 (1923)
("But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important for
such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.
If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of

the taxpayer." (Emphasis added.)); Tandy Leather Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 693, 695 (5th
Cir. 1965) ("[T]he burden in such a case is always on the collector to show, in justification
of his levy and collection of an excise tax, that the statute plainly and clearly lays the tax ...

." (Emphasis added.); "Any doubts as to their meaning are to be resolved against the taxing
authority.").
It is well-settled in this state and throughout American jurisprudence that a taxing statute
is to be construed strictly against the taxing authority, and this rule of law is not dependent upon
the posture or identity of the parties involved. Indeed, it is nonsensical to assert that this rule of
statutory construction is only applicable when asserted by the intended taxpayer. The potential
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and very undesirable outcome of such a rule would be that taxing statutes could receive multiple
interpretations by different courts, depending on who in each lawsuit was permitted to demand
strict scrutiny and who was not. This is not an affirmative defense available only to certain
parties; it is a matter of statutory construction that must be applied uniformly.
Finally, the IAC contradicts itself when it asserts, on the one hand, that "it is
inappropriate that [TracFone] now attempts to stand in the shoes of the ultimate payer, and claim
the protections afforded to the ultimate payer" (IAC Brief, p. 6), while in the same breath
continuing to pursue this action and attempt to forcibly place TracFone into "the shoes of the
ultimate payer." "A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose, and
where there is any ambiguity or doubt it must be resolved in favor of the person upon whom
it is sought to impose the tax burden." 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 707

(emphasis added). It is clear from the text of LC. § 31-4804(2) that the E-911 tax is a tax on the
ultimate purchaser; however, these Respondents have opted to pursue TracFone to "impose the
tax burden." Id.

Indeed, the Counties have filed a counterclaim against TracFone for that very

purpose. Thus, even if the rule of statutory interpretation requiring strict construction of taxing
statutes against taxing authorities was somehow only applicable in cases where an ultimate
taxpayer was a party to the litigation, this case meets that standard.

IV.

RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL

Moving to the Cross-Appeal filed jointly by the Counties, TracFone notes first that the
arguments raised in the Cross-Appeal do not have uniform support by the Respondents, and were
previously and rightfully rejected by the District Court. TracFone is compelled to question how
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any party to this action still legitimately contends that Section 13(b) of the definition of
"telecommunications provider" clearly and unambiguously applied to TracFone.
Before addressing the merits of the Cross-Appeal, TracF one briefly reminds the Court of
the procedural backdrop of the arguments asserted therein.

When the Respondents initially

moved for Partial Summary Judgment below, they relied entirely on their uninformed
understanding of the terminology included in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) regarding "specialized
mobile radio providers."

(R. at 000530 ("[I]n order to show that TracFone is . . . a

'telecommunications provider' subject to the Fee collection and remittance requirements of the
Act, it must be shown that TracFone is one of 'certain specialized mobile radio providers
designated as covered carriers by 47 CFR 20.18."' (Emphasis added.)) However, in that initial
argument, the IECC did not attempt to interpret the term "specialized mobile radio providers"
(SMR), and instead framed its entire argument around the fact that TracFone is a commercial
mobile radio service (CMR) provider. (See R. at 000530.) As will be explained below, the
specialized mobile radio system is a specific service subject to separate federal regulations. (R.
at 000842-846).

Although it is one of a series of services which fall under the rubric of

commercial mobile radio service, it is not cellular service such as that which is resold by
TracFone. See 47 CFR § 20.9(a).
The IECC filed that initial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 000525), and
Joinders were filed without additional briefing by both Ada County (R. at 000327) and the IAC
(R. at 000546). When the IECC changed course on Reply, to instead assert that Idaho Code §
31-4802(13)(d) applied to TracFone (R. at 000914), Ada County was the only party to submit
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reply argument on the meaning of "specialized mobile radio" (R. at 000889), introducing new
argument regarding the construction and interpretation of that phrase, which had not been
previously briefed by the IECC. The IAC did not file a Reply Memorandum addressing either
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(b) or (d). (R. at 000006-7.)
In view of the foregoing procedural history, the IA C's Cross-Appeal is improper. Having
only joined in the initial argument of the IECC (the CMR argument), which argument is not the
same argument that has now been presented on Cross-Appeal the (the ~MR argument), the IAC
did not previously asserted any of the arguments on Cross-Appeal, below. In sum, there is no
Cross-Appeal asserted by the IECC, the Cross-Appeal asserted by the IAC is improper, and, as
will be seen, the Cross-Appeal asserted by Ada County fails on the merits.
A. Canons Of Statutory Interpretation Applicable To Particular Words And Phrases.

As the Court is well aware, the statutory definition of "telecommunications provider"
under subsection (b) of the statute incorporates a phrase further defined at Idaho Code § 314802(15): "wireless carrier." That definition reads:
"Wireless carrier" means a cellular licensee, a personal
communications service licensee, and certain specialized mobile
radio providers designated as covered carriers by the federal
communications commission in 47 CPR 20.18 and any successor
to such rule.
All parties have conceded that TracFone is neither a cellular licensee nor a personal
communications service licensee, 17 so the question presented is whether TracFone is, or ever

17

Though the Counties state in their Cross-Appeal that the IECC and the Counties have not
argued that TracFone is either a "cellular licensee" or a "personal communications service
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was, a "certain specialized mobile radio provider[] designated as [a] covered carrier[] by the
federal communications commission in 47 CFR 20.18 and any successor to such rule."
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that
adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009).
Where terms have specific definitions, and the statute "cannot be fully understood without
reading" other provisions of law that define those terms, courts must look to that other law in
order to ascertain the meaning of the legislature's chosen terminology. Huffman v. CIR., 978
F.2d 1139, 1145 (9 th Cir. 1992); see also Nelson v. Bogus Basin Recreational Ass'n, 94 Idaho
175, 484 P.2d 290 (1971) ("Since this is the only section of the statutes which gives a definition
to the term, we must conclude that this is the meaning which applies in both LC. § 72-3 IO(a) and
(d). "). Idaho Code mandates this approach:
Construction of words and phrases. Words and phrases are
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the
language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or
are defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed

licensee," as TracFone does not hold any licenses from the FCC or otherwise, they nevertheless
"note" that neither of those terms is defined in the Act. (Cross-Appeal, p. 8, n. 6.) TracFone
does not understand the necessity or relevance of such a "note" if not to subtly suggest that the
Court should disregard the plain meaning of "licensee." Indeed, this is the argument advanced by
Ada County in the District Court. (R. at 000898 ("Although TracFone does not Hold a License,
it Falls Under the Purview of 'Cellular Licensee' and 'Personal Communications Service
Licensee."').) The District Court seemingly rejected this invitation to depart from any known or
reasonable interpretations of the word "licensee," and this Court should do the same. Stated
simply, one cannot be a licensee if one does not hold a license.
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according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition.

I.C. § 73-113 (emphasis added).
Words that have "both technical and common usage" must be interpreted according to
their technical usage where the statute "plainly indicates" reference to the technical usage.

Huffman, 978 F.2d at 1145. Thus, where a term is a recognized "term of art" or otherwise carries
a specific definition in the context of the statute at issue, courts must view the term in that
context. See, e.g., State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 264 P.3d 970 (2011). Where a statutory
scheme, by its "distinctive features" indicates a particularized meaning for the terms used, courts
must adopt those distinctive features in giving the statute its intended meaning. See FA.A. v.

Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1441 (2012). Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) plainly indicates the legislature's
deference to the federal regulations for interpreting the term "specialized mobile radio."
As the Counties point out, statutes that incorporate terms from other authorities are prone
to encounter problems over time, as amendments to each do not keep up with each other.
However, the United States Supreme Court has provided clear guidance on how to interpret
statutes when apparent inconsistencies are encountered:
A wellsettled canon tends to support the position of respondents:
'Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a
specific and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions
adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions
adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute. * *
* Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption
and does not include subsequent additions or modifications by the
statute so taken unless it does so by express intent.' The weight of
authority holds this rule respecting two separate acts applicable
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where, as here, one section of a statute refers to another section
which alone is amended.
In view of other settled rules of statutory construction, which teach
that a law is presumed, in the absence of clear expression to the
contrary, to operate prospectively; that, if doubt exists as to the
construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer, we feel bound to hold that the Joint
Resolution of 1931 and section 803(a) of the Act of 1932 apply
only to transfers with reservation of life income made subsequent
to the dates of their adoption respectively.

Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 313-314, 58 S. Ct. 559, 564-65 (1938) (internal citations
omitted).
Because the language employed by the legislature in drafting Idaho Code § 31-4802(15)
carries a particular meaning and definition in the context of the law, the use of which does not
render the statute palpably absurd, this Court must assume that the legislature meant what it said
and construe the definition of "wireless carrier" to incorporate the legal meaning of "specialized
mobile radio" found elsewhere in federal telecommunications law, including specifically, the
codified regulations of the United States Federal Communications Commission promulgated
pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
B. The Plain Language ofldaho Code§ 31-4802(15) Incorporates the Technical Usage
of "Specialized Mobile Radio."
In the case at bar, the legislature used a specific term, "specialized mobile radio," and
specifically directed reference to 47 CFR § 20.18.

Thus, this Court must assume that the

legislature intended to give the same meaning to "specialized mobile radio" as is used in the FCC
regulation referenced in the Act. Hassett, 303 U.S. at 314. For the Court to therefore understand
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the plain meaning of I. C. § 31-4802(15), it must consider the particularized definition of SMR
set forth at 47 CFR § 90.7. 18
As noted, the Act's definition of "wireless carrier" includes, along with those licensees of
which TracFone is not one, "certain specialized mobile radio providers designated as covered
carriers by 47 CFR 20.18." LC. § 31-4802(15) (emphasis added).

47 CFR 20.18, in tum,

establishes the applicable scope of the requirements subsequently set forth in that Section,
identifying several types of radio service to which those requirements apply. See 47 CFR §
20.18(a) (Oct. 1, 2005) (which version of the CFR was in effect when the Idaho Legislature
amended Idaho Code § 31-4801 et seq. in both 2007 and 2008). 19 Hassett, 303 U.S. at 314.
That scope is defined as follows:
The following requirements are only applicable to Broadband
personal Communications Services (part 24, subpart E of this
chapter), Cellular Radio Telephone Service (part 22, subpart H of
18

Specialized mobile radio service is referenced in the 2005 version of 47 CFR § 20.18 (the
version that was in effect when the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-4801 et seq. in
both 2007 and 2008). This is the FCC rule which sets forth the emergency calling access
obligations of various CMRS providers. In 2005, it included SMRS providers. 47 CFR § 20.18
is preceded by § 20.9, which defines the universe of "commercial mobile radio services," and
specifically directs attention for "Specialized Mobile Radio service" to Part 90 of the FCC
regulations. The FCC definition of SMRS is contained in 47 CFR § 90.7, governing safety and
special services, and that term must therefore be given the meaning thereto ascribed under
applicable federal telecommunications law. As shown herein, TracFone is not an SMRS
provider.
19 The reference in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) to "certain specialized mobile radio providers
designated ... in 47 CFR 20.18" no longer parallels the actual text of 47 CFR § 20.18, as that
section no longer specifically mentions SMR service. However, this point is inconsequential, as
the Idaho Code still makes reference to "specialized mobile radio" providers, which is a legal
concept still defined at 47 CFR § 90.7, which is only one of fourteen (14) categories of CMRS
service, and which is irrefutably not applicable to TracFone. This change, at best, creates an
ambiguity in this taxing statute that must be construed strictly against the taxing authority(ies ).
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this chapter, and Geographic Area Specialized Mobile Radio
Services and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees in the 800
MHz and 900 MHz bands (included in part 90. subpart S of this
chapter) ....
47 CFR § 20.18(a) (2005). The aggregate of those many types of radio service are collectively
referred to in the regulations as "CMRS providers" (commercial mobile radio service providers).

Id.

This is consistent with the related federal regulation defining the scope of "commercial

mobile radio service." See 47 CFR § 20.9. That section of the regulations reads, in part:
(a) The following mobile services shall be treated as common
carriage services and regulated as commercial mobile radio
services ...
[... ]
(4) Specialized Mobile Radio services that provide interconnected
service (part 90 of this chapter); ....
47 CFR § 20.9. By this section, the scope of "commercial mobile radio service" includes a total
of fourteen (14) different categories of CMRS services, only one of which is the "specialized
mobile radio" service referenced in the Idaho Act. Compare 47 CFR § 20.9 with I.C. § 314802(15). As noted, the legislature defined "wireless carrier" to include (in addition to cellular
licensees and personal communications service licensees) only those "certain specialized mobile
radio providers designated as covered carriers by 47 CFR 20.18." Id. The certain SMR services
identified by 47 CFR § 20.18 are limited to "Geographic Area Specialized Mobile Radio
Services and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees .... "
Just as the Idaho Act specifically references and incorporates portions of 47 CFR § 20.18
(2005), the description of certain SMR services set forth in that regulation specifically references
and incorporates the particular provisions of the federal regulations that describe and govern
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SMR service: " ... Geographic Area Specialized Mobile Radio Services and Incumbent Wide
Area SMR Licensees ... (included in part 90. subpart S of this chapter) .... " 47 CPR§ 20.18
(2005) (emphasis added). Part 90 of Title 47 of the CPR provides the following definition of
"Specialized Mobile Radio system": "A radio system in which licensees provide land mobile
communications services (other than radiolocation services) in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands
on a commercial basis to entities eligible to be licensed under this part, Federal Government
entities, and individuals." 47 CPR § 90.7 (emphasis added).

Importantly, in order to be a

provider of a specialized mobile radio system (as used in 47 CPR § 20.18 (2005), which is in
tum used in LC. § 31-4802(15)), the provider must be licensed as such by the FCC. See also 47
CPR§ 90.655 ("Special licensing requirements for Specialized Mobile Radio systems").
C. TracFone Is Not A Specialized Mobile Radio Provider.

For the benefit of the Court, TracFone sees merit in identifying some history regarding
the types of service that are common to specialized mobile radio services, as such a discussion
will assist the Court's understanding of how markedly different TracFone's .services are from
those encompassed by the SMRS category:
Around 1980 the FCC began licensing 800 MHz band spectrum
use to public safety providers like police and fire departments and
medical rescue teams, which use their spectrum space to develop
and operate mobile communications systems bv which first
responders communicate with each other and with their dispatchers
via hand-held or vehicular mobile radio units. The Commission
also licensed frequencies in the band to commercial licensees using
high-site network architecture known as Specialized Mobile Radio
(SMR) systems. The typical commercial service provided on an
SMR system is service for taxicab companies, service fleets and
other businesses requiring mobile communications which, like
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high-site public safetv communications systems, use a dispatcher.
The mobile units are all tuned to the same station and can both
listen and respond. An SMR licensee sells communications
services to subscribers which use the licensee's equipment and
network architecture for mobile communications operations.

Mobile Relay Associates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted).
Historically, SMRS services are dispatch services, not akin to the cellular telephone
service offered by AT&T, Verizon, and other cellular licensees whose services TracFone resells:
The nature of the dispatch services which SMRS will primarily
offer appear necessarily to involve the establishment of mediumto-long-term contractual relations, whereby the SMRS supply the
needs of users for dispatch facilities for a period of time.

Nat'! Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In the
early 2000s, certain companies began utilizing the 800 MHz band for consumer-based
communications services (most notably, Nextel Communications, Inc.).

See Mobile Relay

Associates, 457 F.3d at 5-7. However, TracFone has never purchased nor offered SMR services
from any entity that offered SMR services. (R. at 000886.)
There can be no dispute that, under the applicable and governing law, rules and
regulations, there is a specific and undeniable reference that was made by the Idaho Legislature
at the time it added the relevant wording to Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). By the usage of the
phrase "specialized mobile radio" and the reference to the federal regulations, the Court is
compelled to construe that phrase according to those federal regulations. Hassett. The factual
record is unrefuted that TracFone does not, and has never, offered or provided "specialized
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mobile radio" services as defined by the federal regulations. (R. at 000886.) While the federal
regulation cited in LC. § 31-4802(15) has since been updated and no longer makes reference to
"specialized mobile radio" service providers, that fact does not simply open the door for the
Counties to interpret the phrase in whatever way they deem fit to serve the exigencies of their
current purposes. The District Court properly analyzed Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b) and (15),
and correctly determined that '"specialized mobile radio providers' is a technical term which the
legislature intended to be defined consistently with the FCC's regulations pertaining to common
carriers and 911 service." (R. at 001038.) The District Court's decision was appropriate: "the
Court is not permitted to read ... words out of the statute or to arbitrarily decide that several of
them should be given generic treatment in order to address a perceived blind spot in the statute,
particularly where a defined term of art in an unambiguous statute is concerned." (R. at 001042.)
D. The Counties' Have Not Provided Any Common-Meaning Explanation Of
'Specialized Mobile Radio.'
In addition to the fact that the plain statutory language directs the reader's attention not to
some colloquial usage of the term "specialized mobile radio provider," but specifically to those
"designated as covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 47 CFR 20.18,"
the Cross-Appellants' argument in favor of adopting "the usual and ordinary meaning of the
word 'specialized"' also fails because the Counties have yet to argue exactly what that common
and usual meaning might be. (See Cross-Appeal at pp. 9-13.) Specifically, though the Counties
now provide a Webster's dictionary definition of the term "specialized" (Cross-Appeal, p. 12)evidence and argument that was neither offered nor argued below (R. at 000899-901) - they do
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not explain how the wireless mobile radio service that TracFone resells from cellular licensees is
"designed, trained, or fitted for one particular purpose or occupation." (Cross-Appeal, p. 12.)
This is the same problem that plagued the Counties' argument below: despite urging the District
Court (and now this Court) to avoid examining the meaning of the term as it is used in 47 CFR
20.18 (the very citation referenced in the statute), the Counties do not provide any reasonable (or
for that matter, unreasonable) discussion about what the term "specialized" adds to the statutory
definition. (See Tr. 7/26/13, pp. 101 :5 - 103:16.) The Counties offer no differentiation between
"specialized" and other forms of mobile radio service - "general?" "non-specialized?" "normal?"
- so as to give any meaning to the term.
Indeed, the Counties inadvertently admit that they cannot ascertain what the term
"specialized" means in its "usual and ordinary meaning": "The Counties submit that whatever
the term 'certain specialized mobile radio providers' means, it was never developed as a 'term
of art' under the common law." (Cross-Appeal at p. 11.) In other words, the Counties' still
cannot and do not take any cognizable position as to what the term "specialized" adds to the
phrase "mobile radio providers" under the statute. The argument is incomplete, and fails to show
how the services resold by TracFone are "specialized" under any understanding of the term Webster's or otherwise.

Failing that, the Counties' argument effectively omits the word

"specialized" from the analysis all together - a tactic prohibited by the rules governing statutory
construction: "When determining the plain meaning of a statute, 'effect must be given to all the
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."' Verska,
151 Idaho at 897 (citing In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P .2d 664, 666 (1936)).
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The Counties' argument, to abandon the meaning of "specialized mobile radio" as specifically
set forth in the federal rules governing the telecommunications industry, must be rejected for
failure to abide by the requisite canons of statutory construction.
E. The Counties' Cross-Appeal On Certain Evidentiary Issues Should Be Denied.
In addition to cross-appealing the District Court's decision that TracFone is not a

"specialized mobile radio provider," the Counties have also cross-appealed certain evidentiary
decisions of the District Court. The cross-appeal on these evidentiary decisions is without merit.
First, the Counties assert that the District Court erred when it failed to strike the Affidavit
of Carolyn Baldino, filed by TracFone in opposition to the Respondent's initial Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ("Baldino Affidavit"). (R. at 000852-884.) Notably, the Counties'
cross-appealed in this regard is inconsistent with their argument on the substantive issue on
Cross-Appeal. The Counties' position is that the District Court erred in construing the phrase
"specialized mobile radio provider" in conjunction with the applicable federal rules governing
"specialized mobile radio service" ("SMRS") (Cross-Appeal, pp.9-16.) However, all that the
Baldino Affidavit did was submit the publicly-available, online FCC government records
demonstrating that neither TracFone nor any of its affiliated entities holds an SMRS license from
the FCC. (R. at 000852-884.) If the Counties' position is that the Court should not interpret the
relevant phrase in the manner that the FCC does, then the FCC' s Ii censure records of SMRS
providers are irrelevant to the Cross-Appeal.
Moreover, the evidence submitted with the Baldino Affidavit, to prove that TracFone
does not hold an SMRS license through the FCC, was duplicative of the Affidavit of Sergio
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Rivera (R. at 000885-887), the Vice-President of Engineering for TracFone. Mr. Rivera testified
that TracFone does not operate in SMRS or resell any SMRS services licensed by the FCC. (Id.)
The Counties provided no evidence below that TracFone is an SMRS licensee/provider
(according to how the FCC defines the term), so whether or not the FCC records attached to the
Baldino Affidavit were admissible, it remains an undisputed fact in this case that TracFone is
neither an SMRS licensee nor an SMRS provider. For purposes of the substantive issues in the
Counties' Cross-Appeal, then, the Baldino Affidavit is a moot point.
Because the evidence presented with the Baldino Affidavit is irrelevant to the Counties'
Cross-Appeal, and is in fact duplicative of the unrefuted evidence in this case that TracFone is
not an FCC licensee (SMRS or otherwise), there is no need to address the merits of the Counties'
arguments on the Baldino Affidavit. In the interest of brevity, to the extent that the Court may
wish to nevertheless hear argument on the Baldino Affidavit, TracFone rests on and incorporates
the arguments it submitted to the District Court. (R. at 000958-971.)
Turning to the Counties' Cross-Appeal on the admission of evidence offered in support
of TracFone's request for an interlocutory appeal (the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits) (CrossAppeal, pp. 25-31), the District Court did not err when it permitted TracFone to
submit/reincorporate previously-stricken evidence in support of its Motion for Certification
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) and/or I.AR. 12.

Of greatest importance, however, the District

Court's decision to admit evidence in relation to a Motion for Certification filed on January 14,
2014 is not at all relevant to this interlocutory appeal, in which the parties have appealed only the
District Court's substantive decisions of August 26, 2013 and December 31, 2013. Evidence
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Rule 105 permits the District Court to allow for limited admissibility of "evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose .... "
The issues presented to the District Court on the initial summary judgment motion and
TracFone's subsequent motion for reconsideration focused on the canons governing statutory
construction and statutory interpretation. The issue presented in the Motion for Certification, for
which the subject Affidavits were admitted, addressed the propriety of an interlocutory appeal issues not previously addressed by any party in this litigation. TracFone therefore resubmitted
the previously-stricken evidence, for the limited purpose of showing that there were "substantial
grounds for difference of opinion" on the underlying statutory interpretation issues - whether the
Act applies to TracFone. See I.A.R. 12(a). The Counties have not appealed the propriety of the
District Court's grant of TracFone's Motion for Certification/Permissive Appeal, and have in
fact taken advantage of this interlocutory appeal to appeal their own disagreements with the
District Court. As such, it is not proper in this interlocutory appeal for this Court to address an
evidentiary issue that has nothing to do with the substantive issues actually certified by the
District Court. The District Court's consideration of evidence that was resubmitted after the
Summary Judgment and Reconsideration Decisions and only to meet the burdens associated with
an interlocutory appeal is not germane to this appeal and are not properly before the Court.
F. The Counties Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees On Cross-Appeal; TracFone Is.

At the end of their Cross-Appeal, the Counties insert a brief claim for costs and attorney
fees, in the event they prevail on cross-appeal. As authority for such an award, the Counties cite
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Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 1 123, as well as Idaho Appellate Rule 41. (Cross-Appeal, p. 31.)
The Counties' request fails as a matter of law, based on well-settled precedent of this Court.
"'Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract,' ...
or by court rule, Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs Office, 147 Idaho 491, 496-97, 211 P.3d 100,
105-06 (2009) .... " Capps v. FIA Card Servs., NA., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590
(2010). The Counties are all state-affiliated parties who have sought a declaratory judgment and
dependent damages associated with an alleged statutory obligation of TracFone to collect and
remit E911 taxes. Applicable here, Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) reads:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 has been repeatedly deemed the "exclusive remedy" for an award of
attorney fees in suits involving the state, state agencies, and/or political subdivisions of the state.
In actions involving a political subdivision of the state of Idaho and a person, when those actions
do not fall under the purview of any other statute otherwise containing a separate attorney fee
provision, 20 this Court has indicated that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for
awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies. 21 Compare City of Osburn v. Randel,

20

Notably, though it was not argued by the Counties, the Idaho Emergency Communications Act
does not include a separate attorney fee provision.
21 The only exception to this rule, as recently set forth in Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't
of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 67, 305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013), reh'g denied (Aug. 29, 2013), is that
"attorney fees may be awarded under any other statute that expressly applies to a state agency or

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 40

19360-001

152 Idaho 906,910,277 P.3d 353,357 (2012) (citing Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist.
No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,266 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010)), with Sanders v. Board ofTrustees of
Mountain Home School Dist. No. 193, 156 Idaho 269, _ , 322 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2014). This

"Court applies a two-part test for Idaho Code § 12-117 on appeal: the party seeking fees must be
the prevailing party and the losing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law." Id.
Even if the Counties' reliance on Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 12-123 was proper, they
have failed to justify an award on Cross-Appeal according to the standards of those code
sections. "When faced with an appeal and cross-appeal, this Court may independently consider
the appropriateness of an award for attorney fees in each appeal. Roark v. Bentley, 139 Idaho
793, 798, 86 P.3d 507,512 (2004). For an award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and
12-123, this Court has been clear:
Attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal
under Section 12-121 only if the appeal was brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Fenwick v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 144 Idaho 318, 324, 160 P.3d
757, 763 (2007) .... Section 12-123 does not apply on appeal to
this Court. By its terms, an award of attorney fees as a sanction for
frivolous conduct must be made "at any time prior to the
commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one
(21) days after the entry of judgment in a civil action." LC. § 12123(2)(a).

Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350,353,209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009).

political subdivision, such as sections 12-120(3) and 12-121." The Counties have not sought an
award pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3), nor could they as this is not a commercial transaction, and
they have failed to even attempt to meet the burden required for an award under section 12-121,
as explained below.
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In support of their argument for attorney fees, the Counties do not contend that
TracFone's arguments opposing the efforts to misclassify it as a specialized mobile radio
provider are made "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. Rather, the Counties
merely direct the Court's attention back to the argument for attorney fees contained in Ada
County's Response Brief (Cross-Appeal, p. 31), but Ada County's Response Brief offers no
argument for an award of attorney fees associated with the Cross-Appeal. In that brief, Ada
County merely argues "TracFone has now litigated the identical question three times, and Ada
County suggests that TracFone's arguments on appeal, like those it has made previously, have
not been strong." (Ada County Brief, p. 49.) While TracFone disagrees that its arguments are
not strong, and notes that it previously prevailed when it litigated the issues raised in the CrossAppeal, the salient point for purposes of attorney fees is that the Counties have not argued that
TracFone's arguments are frivolous (nor could they). The Counties have consequently failed to
meet their burden even under the incorrect statutory basis asserted.
Finally, the Counties' reliance on Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is also insufficient for an
award of attorney fees in this action. 22 As was clearly determined by this Court in Capps v. FIA

Card Services, NA., 149 Idaho 737, 240 P.3d 583 (2010), "[t]hat rule 'sets forth the procedure
for awarding attorney fees in appeals before this Court, but does not provide authority to award
attorney fees."' 149 Idaho at 744 (quoting Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 315,322, 775 P.2d

22

Though the Counties have also requested costs associated with their Cross-Appeal, they have
not cited either a statute or a rule permitting such an award. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 would have
been the appropriate Rule under which to make such a claim, but the Counties' Cross-Appeal is
silent as to that Rule.
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629, 636 (1989)). "As we have long held and oft repeated, Idaho Appellate Rule 41 does not
provide an independent basis for attorney fees on appeal because it is a procedural rule."
Parkside Sch., Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, 145 Idaho 176, 179, 177 P.3d 390, 393

(2008). The Counties offer no valid authority for an award of attorney fees on Cross-Appeal.
However, under the standards governing an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §
12-117, TracFone is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 23 As noted herein, the Counties have
no basis to ignore the plain and unambiguous reference in Idaho Code § 31-4802( 15) to 40 CFR
20.18.

By this point in these proceedings, especially in view of the District Court's own

historical analysis, the Counties are well-aware of the historical backdrop of the term
"specialized mobile radio" in the telecommunications industry. The Counties have provided no
legal justification for why, simply because the Federal Regulation cited in the Idaho Statute no
longer references the terminology used in the Idaho Statute, the taxing authorities of this state
should be permitted to exploit that inconsistency to expand their taxing authority beyond the
plain language of the legislature's reference to the Federal Regulations. Further, despite a facade
of an argument that the word "specialized" (as used within the phrase "specialized mobile radio
providers") has a common, dictionary definition, the Counties fail to demonstrate (or even argue)
how TracFone's resold cellular service is "specialized," as compared to other type of "mobile
radio provider." In other words, they unreasonably and unjustifiably read the word "specialized"
23

Regarding the Cross-Appeal by the IAC, TracFone again notes that the IAC did not raise any
of the arguments on Cross-Appeal below. Therefore, the IAC has no foundation on which to
bring those arguments. The Cross-Appeal ought to be denied as to the IAC, and TracFone
should be awarded its costs and fees on Cross-Appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40 and 41, and LC. §
12-117.
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entirely out of the statute. When a political subdivision "ignore[ s] the plain and unambiguous
language of a statute or ordinance," then a fee award is appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-11 7.
City of Osburn, 152 Idaho at 909. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rules

40 and 41, TracFone requests an award of costs and fees on the Counties' Cross-Appeal.

V.

ATTOR~EY FEES ON APPEAL

Certain of the Respondents have also argued for an award of attorney fees for defending
against TracFone's Appeal. Respondent IAC has not requested or argued for an award of
attorney fees. Ada County's claim, as noted above, fails for lack of legal support and factual
argument under Idaho Code § 12-117 (though Ada County has argued that TracFone's
arguments, in its view, "have not been strong" (Ada County Brief, p. 49), it has made no
showing that TracFone's arguments have been "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" under
I.C. § 12-117(1)). Similarly, the IECC's argument for attorney fees merely recite the procedural
posture of this case - citing both the PU C's and the District Court's decisions that TracFone was
an obligated "telecommunications provider." (IECC Brief, p. 19.) Under Idaho law, however,
merely losing a case does not satisfy the burden necessary to impose fees. See, e.g., In re Jerome
Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 153 Idaho 298,318,281 P.3d 1076, 1096 (2012) ("Although we find

Jerome County to be the prevailing party, we do not find that the Appellants have acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law."). As such, even if TracFone is not the prevailing party in this
appeal, there is no legal basis for an award of attorney fees against it. (See also R. at 002023
(District Court acknowledging "TracFone's arguments are certainly not frivolous.").)
Finally, TracFone reiterates its claim for attorney fees, as set forth in its initial briefing.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 44

19360-001

Given that all of the Respondents have claimed the authority of the literal language of the statute,
yet none of them have actually followed that literal language, and that TracFone undeniably
offers the exact same service as was addressed by the Legislature in Idaho Code § 314802(13 )(b), there is no reasonable basis in fact or law to shoehorn TracF one under the
inapplicable provisions ofldaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) simply because the Respondents would
like the Courts to remedy a perceived oversight in the drafting of the statutory definition. Accord
City of Osburn, 152 Idaho at 909.

VI.

CONCLUSION

On the grounds and under the authority set forth herein, TracFone respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the District Court's determinations that TracFone was a provider of "other
communications service" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )( d) and that the tax collection and
remittance obligations of Idaho Code § 31-4804 clearly and unambiguously applied to TracFone
prior to July 1, 2013; to affirm the District Court's determination that TracFone was not a
"specialized mobile radio provider" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), such that TracFone is not
an obligated "telecommunications provider" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b); remand this
case back to the District Court with instructions to conclude this matter consistently with these
determinations; and to award TracFone its costs and fees associated with both the Cross-Appeal
and the Appeal, pursuant to LC. § 12-117.

[**Signature On Following Page**]
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Dated this 19 th day of December, 2014.
GREE:'JER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

By R ~ ~ ~ y d Ill
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP
Dean J. Miller
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

Mitchell F. Brecher
Attorneys for TracFone Wireless, Inc.
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